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International trade
and global poverty
Alieto Aldo Guadagni and Jorge Kaufmann
I n the light of the extent of global poverty and the challenge
presented by the Millennium Development Goals for its reduction, this
article analyzes one of the clearest and most effective ways of reducing
poverty: trade liberalization —especially agricultural trade— by the
industrialized countries. 75 percent of all the poor worldwide are in the
rural sector of the developing countries, and the agricultural products
that these countries could sell face protectionist barriers —tariffs, non-
tariff measures, subsidies— imposed by the industrialized countries. This
article examines the topic in detail, both globally and as to specific
products, and presents —based on several studies— the benefits that
trade liberalization in industrialized countries would bring to developing
countries, emphasizing the great impact that this liberalization could
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For a reader not versed in economic matters, the title
of this article could raise more than one question: what
is the relation between international trade and poverty
and marginalization in the developing world? What is
the connection between the images of products being
loaded and unloaded in ports and airports, or the
crossing of frontiers by trucks and freight trains, and
the vast poverty-stricken rural areas in Africa, Latin
America, Eastern Europe and Asia? We hope that these
pages will shed some light on the close link between
global poverty and the rules currently governing
international trade.
This article begins by addressing poverty-related
topics: the Millennium Development Goals, the recent
evolution of global poverty and its main characteristic:
its rural dimension. It then deals with international trade
issues, such as agricultural subsidies in the industrialized
countries and several agricultural products which are
severely affected by the protectionism imposed by these
countries. Finally, it presents estimates as to the impact
that the eradication of the main protectionist measures
in agriculture would have on the reduction of global
poverty. These estimates are the work of several
specialized institutions, mainly the World Bank.
II
The Millennium Development Goals
In September 2001, the United Nations presented a
road map for the implementation of the Millennium
Declaration adopted by its 189 member States a year
earlier, in order that globalization could be fully inclu-
sive and equitable. This plan involved a commitment
by governments and the United Nations, including the
institutions arising from the Bretton Woods Conference
(the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), among
others, to work toward those goals. It was based on the
Millennium Development Goals and sought to achieve
sustainable development through the eradication of
poverty and the improvement of a number of social
indicators.
The Millennium Development Goals are as
follows:
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development.
Each of these goals is associated with the attainment
of a specific target and includes the definition of
measurement indicators to monitor and assess the
results. Thus, the goal of eradicating extreme poverty
involves halving, the number of poor people, defined
as those whose income is less than one dollar a day,
between 1990 and 2015.
We will focus the analysis on this first goal, since
it is somehow a prerequisite for the attainment of the
other goals, and we will answer the following two
questions: What have been the poverty trends between
1990 and 2000?; and How is poverty expected to
evolve toward 2015?
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III
Poverty trends in the developing countries
Poverty trends between 1990 and 2001 vary according
to the definition of poverty applied. If the poor are
considered to be those living on less than one dollar a
day —that is to say, those in a situation of extreme
poverty— then during that period there was a
significant reduction in the number of poor: from 1,219
million to 1,101 million. On the other hand, if the poor
are considered to be those living on less than two
dollars a day, then the number increased from 2,689
million to 2,733 million over that period (World Bank,
2004a).
Even more important is that fact that under both
these definitions of poverty the regional dispersion is
rather significant. The only region in which poverty
went down was Asia; in the other regions the number
of poor increased. Thus, under the definition based on
an income of less than one dollar a day, the number
of poor in Asia went down from 934 to 712 million
between 1990 and 2001, whereas in Africa it rose from
233 to 321 million over the same period, and in Latin
America it went up, albeit only slightly, from 49 to 50
million. If we consider the people with an income of
less than two dollars a day, over the same period the
number of poor in Asia went down from 2,075 to 1,927
million, while in Latin America it increased from 125
to 128 million.
Poverty rates show better results. Thus, the
percentage of poor in the developing countries fell from
27.9% in 1990 to 21.3% in 2001, considering the
definition of an income of less than one dollar a day,
and from 61.6% to 52.8% under the definition of less
than two dollars a day.
Figure 1 shows that poverty rates are not only
falling in Asia but also in Latin America. In 2001 it
was estimated that 22.2% of the population received
less than one dollar a day in Asia, which represented
FIGURE 1
Three regions:a Extreme poverty rates in developing countries
(Percentage of people living on less than one dollar a day)
Source: World Bank (2004a and 2004b).
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a significant reduction compared with 1990; however,
this rate was higher than the 9.5% registered in Latin
America, where poverty had gone down slightly from
11.3%. Over the same period, the percentage of the
population in extreme poverty rose from 0.5% to
3.7% in Eastern Europe and from 31.2% to 32.9% in
Africa.
It is interesting to consider the levels of poverty
rates expected in 2015. The number of poor worldwide
would continue to fall, reaching 809 million in the case
of those with less than one dollar a day and to 2,320
million in the case of those with less than two dollars.
It is estimated that the number of poor will continue
to fall rapidly in Asia and to increase in Africa. In Latin
America and Eastern Africa, the number would fall
from the 2001 levels, although only slightly in the Latin
American region.
According to these projections, the rate of extre-
me poverty worldwide in 2015 would be 13.3%, which
would mean achieving the goal of halving the number
of poor from the 1990 level (27.9%).1 By regions,
extreme poverty rates would be 32.6% in Africa, 9.3%
in Asia, 7.5% in Latin America and 1.4% in Eastern
Europe. Only Asia would reach the Millennium goal,
with a rate equivalent to almost a quarter of that
registered in 1990. As noted, Latin America would not
manage to reduce its extreme poverty rate to 5.6%,
which is the sought-for target.
Table 1 shows the number of poor over the whole
period considered, i.e., from 1990 to 2015.
We can note that in the 25 years from 1990 to
2015, extreme poverty in Asia would fall by 590
million people (over half of them Chinese), but it
would grow still further in Africa whereas in Latin
America it would hardly fall.
In 1990, for every poor African or Latin American
there were over three poor Asians. In 2001 this ratio
went down to 1.8. By 2015 there will be only 0.74
Asians in extreme poverty for every poor person in the
rest of the world. In 1990, eight out of ten in extreme
poverty worldwide were Asians; by 2015 there will be
only four. In other words, poverty is increasingly an
African and Latin American phenomenon and less and
less an Asian problem.
TABLE 1
Developing countries: Evolution of poverty,
1990-2015
(Variations, in millions of people)
People living on People living on
one dollar a day  two dollars a day
Total –410 –369
Asia –590 –597
   China –304 –611
Rest of the world 180 228
   Latin America –2 –8
   Eastern Europ 5 –13
   Africa 177 249
Source: World Bank (2004a and 2004b).
1
 In World Bank (2004c) a more optimistic situation is presented
for 2015 in which the global goal would be more comfortably
reached, with an extreme poverty rate of 12.5%. This projection is
based on the assumption of an annual growth rate of GDP of 4.7%
between 2004 and 2015.
IV
The rural dimension of global poverty
An essential characteristic of global poverty is that
three out of four poor live in rural areas (World Bank
Institute, 2004). Consequently, we can only win or lose
the war against poverty in the rural area.
Based on the data available on urban and rural
income, we see that 63% of the population and 73%
of the poor live in rural areas. This ratio is common to
all regions. The level of rural poverty is high in all the
developing countries, regardless of the income level.
Most of the population in low-income countries is poor;
however, in the least developed countries the poverty
rate in rural households is almost 82%. The share of
rural households in the total of poor households is
falling due to urbanization, but it will still not fall
below 50% before 2035 (World Bank, 2003).
A sustained rise in agricultural productivity in the
developing countries is needed in order to reduce ru-
ral poverty. However, achieving this sustained rise is not
only the developing countries’ exclusive responsibility.
On the contrary, for this to be possible it is essential
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to open up the agricultural markets of the industrialized
countries, which are currently closed.
Without exception, all the industrialized countries
block the free access of products from the developing
countries and, in addition, in most of the cases, they
distort world markets with subsidies to agricultural
production and exports. Since rural poverty is the most
endemic and painful form of poverty in the world, the
barriers to free agricultural trade are essentially
regressive. Consequently, there will be no appreciable
reduction in global poverty unless economic growth of
the developing countries is facilitated, but for many of
them —especially the poorest countries— there will be
no growth without technological advances in their
agriculture.
As the poor mainly produce agricultural goods,
along with other products that are labour-intensive (tex-
tiles, for example), it is obvious that the global trade
order is biased against them. According to recent
estimates, equitable global liberalization of trade could
reduce the number of poor in the world by over 300
million people: that is to say, it would contribute with
an additional 60% to what is projected in the 25 years
ending in 2015 (World Bank, 2001a).
An end to protectionism has repeatedly been called
for at the biennial meetings of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For example, the
final communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the
Development Committee of April 2003 clearly stated
that “It is essential for developed countries to do more
to liberalize their markets and eliminate trade-distorting
subsidies, including in the areas of agriculture, textiles
and clothing, which are of particular importance for
developing countries” (Development Committee, 2003).
V
Agricultural subsidies in the
industrialized countries
The analysis of global trade protectionism is too broad
a topic to be dealt with adequately in a few pages;
therefore, in this article we will only present some of
the vast evidence available on the unfair practices
currently prevailing.
One of the most important inequalities observed
in the world trade system, and that seriously impedes
growth of the developing countries’ exports, is the high
level of agricultural subsidies applied by the
industrialized countries.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) estimates that farmers in its
member countries received State support equivalent to
31% of their income in the period 2000-2002. The
highest agricultural subsidies are those given in
Switzerland (73% of farmers’ total income), Norway
(68%), South Korea (66%) and Iceland (63%). Farmers
in Japan receive 59% of their income in the form of
subsidies, and in the European Union, 35%. United
States farmers are below the average, receiving subsidies
equivalent to 21% of their total income (OECD, 2003).
Table 2 shows subsidies as a percentage of
farmers’ total income in the industrialized countries for
their main exports. Those with the highest subsidies are
rice, sugar, dairy products and meat.
These subsidies do not only have an impact within
the industrialized countries, but also beyond their
frontiers, depressing the income of poor farmers in the
developing countries who produce these goods
efficiently.
Agricultural subsidies in the OECD countries totaled
more than US$ 300 billion per year in 1999-2001: that
is to say, they represented more than six times the total
direct aid given by the industrialized countries to poor
countries. This amount includes both direct and indirect
subsidies, and it is precisely the latter —restrictive “on
TABLE 2
Industrialized countries: Subsidies on
agricultural exports, 2000-2002
(As a percentage of producer’s income)
Maize 27%
Beef and veal 33%
Wheat 37%
Other cereals 41%
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2
 This figure conceals great tariff dispersion, with maximum levels
of as much as 350%. For more information, see ECLAC (2003) and
World Bank (2003).
TABLE 3
“I’ve got a milk cow … but not just
any milk cow”
Number of cows Subsidy per cow (dollars)
(millions) Per year Per day
European Union 33.8 975 2.67
Japan 1.6 4 328 11.86
Source: Estimates based on data from OECD. This type of comparison
was not our idea; for example, a similar exercise can be found in
Stern (2002).
the other OECD countries, US$ 56.6 billion. The main
products benefiting from this support were meat (US$
47.3 billion), milk (US$ 42.1 billion), rice (US$ 26.4




With regard to import duties or customs tariffs, the
industrialized countries have built a real “protectionist
fortress”, levying taxes more heavily on the goods
produced by the poor countries (agricultural products
and textiles), as well as imposing numerous non-tariff
barriers (quotas, import licences, anti-dumping duties
and technical requirements) that in many cases are
more burdensome than the tariffs themselves. In the
case of tariffs, for example, the average customs tariffs
on agricultural imports applied by the European Union
is 20%, and 9% in the case of the United States.2 In
the case of textiles and clothing, the average tariff in
the United States is 8.9%, while in the European Union
it is 7.9% (Oxfam International, 2002). These figures
contrast starkly with the average tariff of only 1%
applied on imports by these countries reciprocally (The
Economist, 2003).
The International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) recently estimated the effects of that protectionist
fortress on the exports of the poor countries. According
to those estimates, the developing countries lose around
US$ 40 billion per year due to the lower exports as a
result of the agricultural protectionism of the
industrialized countries. This means that, if those
protectionist barriers did not exist, the agricultural
exports of the developing countries would be three
times higher.
The largest share of this loss corresponds to Latin
America, which currently exports some US$ 32 billion
dollars to the industrialized countries but could export
more than US$ 46 billion. In other words, the annual
loss to the region is over US$ 14 billion.
If we consider potential income from exports not
materialized because of trade barriers, the developing
countries lose a net income of around US$ 24 billion
per year as a result of the agricultural protectionism of
the industrialized countries: over half of this loss is due
to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the
European Union. The region most affected is Latin
America, with an annual income loss estimated at US$
8.3 billion (IFPRI, 2003). A pathetic example is that of
the milk subsidies, shown in table 3).
If the total subsidies are divided by the number
of cows, the annual subsidy per cow is almost US$
1,000 in the European Union and over US$ 4,000 in
Japan. This means that in the European Union each
cow is subsidized at a rate of US$ 2.67 per day, while
in Japan the rate is US$ 11.86 per day. These figures
contrast sharply with the poverty levels in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where 48% of the population lives on less than
one dollar a day and 77% on less than two dollars. This
contrast between the milk subsidies in the
industrialized world and the poverty in the Third World
is truly overwhelming.
A sad anecdote: the Netherlands Government —one
of the most generous countries in the world in terms of
international cooperation— has been supporting
Tanzanian dairy products for over 20 years. Yet, at the
same time, the European Union exports powder milk
that is subsidized at three times the rate of the Dutch
aid, thus further impoverishing this African nation.
the border” measures— that account for most of the
total subsidies.
The volume of agricultural support was as
follows: European Union, US$ 112.7 billion; United
States, US$ 95.5 billion; Japan, US$ 64.8 billion; and
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The levels of protectionism faced by exporters
from the industrialized countries and those from
developing countries are extremely disparate, which
further exacerbates the unfairness of global trade. As
shown in table 4, Latin American agricultural goods
accessing the markets of industrialized countries face an
average tariff of 20.4%.3 In contrast, the industrialized
countries’ exports of non-agricultural goods face an
average tariff of 8.5% when entering the Latin
American markets.
Thus, the main exports of the two groups of
countries in question are subject to tariffs which differ
by a factor of 2.4.
TABLE 4
Latin America and the industrialized
countries: Disparity between average tariffs
(Levels of protection faced by exporters
in each region)
Importing region
Exporting region Latin America Industrialized countries
Agricultural goods
   Latin America 20.4%
Non-agricultural goods
   Industrialized countries 8.5%
Source: World Bank (2003).
3
 It cannot be denied that the developing countries also sometimes
apply significant tariffs to agricultural goods. Thus, for example,
the agricultural exports of Latin America pay tariffs of 42.1% in
East Asia and 24.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa. For more information
in this respect, see World Bank (2003).
VII
The poor face the highest tariffs
Table 4 shows that the exports by the poor of the
developing countries —in this particular case, Latin
America— to the industrialized countries face higher
tariffs than those imposed by the developing countries
on their imports from the industrialized nations. The
liberalization of domestic trade generally benefits the
poor because it facilitates the shifting of resources from
capital-intensive to labor-intensive sectors.
The industrialized countries reciprocally apply
tariffs of 1% on their manufactured goods but impose
tariffs of 5% on similar imports from East Asia, 6%
on those from the Middle East, and 8% on those from
South Asia. Mongolia, for example, pays in tariffs to
the United States a similar amount to that paid by
Norway, even though it sells only 3% of what Norway
exports to the United States. Can anyone claim that this
system allows the poor to exploit their development
potential?
Some comparisons made by Oxfam International,
a British charitable organization, are very telling. The
tariffs levied by the United States on imports from the
developing countries can be as much as 20 times higher
than those applied on imports from other rich
developed countries. Last year, the average United
States tariff on imports from Bangladesh was 14%, a
total of US$ 301 million, although that country
supplied only 0.1% of total United States imports. This
amount was only slightly less than the total duties paid
on imports from France, which were subject to a tariff
of only 1% and represented 2.4% of total United States
imports (Oxfam International, 2003).
The tariffs of the European Union severely
discriminate against the developing countries. Its duties
on imports from India were almost four times higher
than those on imports from the United States and were
more than eight times higher than those from Sri Lanka
and Uruguay.4
4
 Oxfam International (2003).
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VIII
The tariff scaling of the industrialized
countries
One of the features of the tariff structure of the
industrialized countries is that it strongly discourages
production with higher value added, as seen in table 5.
This situation, which prevails in the European
Union, the United States and Japan, also exists in the
other industrialized countries. Canada’s tariffs on
processed food products, for example, are 12 times
higher than those applied to products in the primary
stage of processing.
The European Union’s tariff is less than 4% on
imports of yarn, but 14% on clothing.
The United States and the European Union apply
zero tariffs on imports of cocoa beans, but up to 30.6%
on processed products such as cocoa paste and choco-
late. As a result, the developing countries produce over
90% of all cocoa beans but less than 5% of world
chocolate production.
TABLE 5
Tariffs applied by the industrialized countries:
The developing countries are condemned to
export goods without value added
(Percentages)
Exports Tariff applied by:
European United
Union State Japan
Coffee As raw material 7.3 0.1 6.0
Processed 12.1 10.0 18.8
Cocoa As raw material 0.0 0.0 0.0
Processed 30.6 15.5 22.0
Sugar As raw material 18.9 2.0 25.0
Processed 36.4 17.7 a
Fruit As raw material 9.2 4.6 8.7
Processed 22.5 10.7 16.7
Source: World Bank (2003).
a Specific tariffs.
IX
The richest receive the biggest subsidies
1. Inequitable distribution of agricultural
subsidies
The industrialized countries would benefit from the
reduction of protectionism and agricultural subsidies,
most of which go to large-scale farmers who earn more
than the average family in the European Union, Japan
and the United States. Protectionism and subsidies cost
the average family US$ 1,000 per year in those regions
because of the higher cost of food.
In many industrialized countries the average
income of farmers is higher than the average national
income: 250% in the Netherlands, 175% in Denmark,
160% in France and 110% in the United States and
Japan.
The OECD estimates that only a quarter of every
dollar spent on support ends up in the farmers’ pockets:
the rest goes to suppliers of inputs and owners of other
factors of production. The most important result of
these support programmes is that they inflate land
prices.
A recent study (Environmental Working Group,
2003) reveals data that illustrate this inequitable
distribution of agricultural subsidies. In the United
States, the large farms are mainly responsible for the
increase in the agricultural surpluses that are exported,
getting therefore an even bigger share of the support.
In 1995 the big received US$ 4 billion (55% of all
federal agricultural subsidies), while in 2002 their share
rose to US$ 7.8 billion (65%).
In the United States, 25% of the largest farms
receive 89% of the subsidies, while the remaining 1.6
million farms in the country receive little support. In
2001, David Rockefeller and Ted Turner were among
the recipients of agricultural subsidies.
In the European Union the way the support is
distributed is not much different. The biggest farmers
receive nearly 75% of the total support (OECD, 2003),
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while 4% of the farmers with the biggest farms receive
21% of the total. The farms following in size generate
17% of the agricultural production and receive 19% of
the subsidies. The remaining two million farms pro-
duce little and receive only minimal support.
In Japan and Canada 25% of the largest farms
receive 68% and 70% of the total support, respectively.
2. Anti-dumping measures
With regard to the impact of anti-dumping measures
—another source of inequalities— box 1 provides an
example concerning Vietnam, based on information
from the World Bank (2003).
Because of the potential harm resulting from anti-
dumping measures, as the one mentioned in the last
paragraph of box 1, some countries have bilaterally
agreed not to apply these measures. This was the case,
for example, of the Free Trade Treaty signed between
Chile and Canada in 1996.
3. Some protectionist measures that affect
important agricultural products
Following is a brief account of some protectionist
measures that affect the trade of agricultural goods that
are of key importance in global production.5
a) Cotton
The world trade in cotton is severely distorted due
to the policies applied. The world’s biggest cotton
producer, the United States, faces much higher
production costs than African producers such as Mali
or Burkina Faso.
The United States is the country that provides the
greatest support to its cotton producers. Its 25,000
producers receive US$ 4 billion in government subsidies
to produce cotton at a commercial value of only US$
3 billion. Such subsidies depress the global market of
this good, causing harm, among others, to the 11
million producers in West Africa. In 2001-2002
producer prices in the United States were 91% higher
than in the world market.
Meanwhile, the European Union provides support
in the amount of US$ 600 million per year to its own
cotton producers, which shows that the price projections
and exports of the developing countries —especially
of Africa— would substantially improve if the
industrialized countries reduced or eliminated their
support to producers.
b) Sugar
Sugar is one of the most politically distorted
commodities worldwide. Most of the OECD support to
sugar producers is given in the European Union, Japan
and the United States: US$ 6.4 billion, which almost
equals the value of the total exports of the developing
countries.
High import duties, together with subsidies, keep
domestic prices of this product in the United States and
the European Union at levels almost twice as much as
those prevailing in the global markets.
The high domestic prices of sugar in the European
Union, Japan, and the United States have encouraged
Box 1
A VIETNAMESE STORY
After embarking on a vigorous programme of non-Marxist reforms, Vietnam was one of the most successful
examples of globalization in the 1990s. After having been an importer of rice, this country became the world
second largest exporter of that product, as well as an actor in the world coffee trade.
After only a few years, half a million Vietnamese were estimated to live on catfish trade, promoted by
private entrepreneurs. Vietnam captured 20% of the market for frozen catfish fillets in the United States, causing
prices to fall and giving rise to concern in the Mississippi Farm Bureau.
As a result, the United States Department of Trade recently imposed tariffs of between 37% and 64% on
Vietnamese catfish. The United States International Trade Commission gave its final verdict on 23 July 2000:
it ruled that the unfair competition caused by Vietnamese dumping harmed the United States catfish industry
and, therefore, the tariffs became permanent.
Something similar happened two years ago with Argentine honey.
The mere possibility of a country imposing anti-dumping measures causes a drop in exports to the countries
applying such measures, even when the tariff applied is low. Thus, the mere threat of an anti-dumping duty
may deter the export of goods to those markets.
5
 Much of the information presented is from the World Bank (2003).
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high costs, inefficient local production, and the use of
sugar substitutes. At the same time, they have reduced
local consumption and made these countries, after
being importers of almost half of the global sugar
exports in the 1970s, become exporters in the 1990s.
The European Union subsidies make it
economically feasible to produce sugar beet in Finland,
which affects the poor but efficient sugar producers in
tropical countries, who can hardly survive.
World sugar prices are now below the costs of the
most efficient producers. The world sugar market has
shrunk to a residual trade, with 80% of the global
production sold at high prices in protected markets.
c) Wheat
A similar situation is observed in the wheat
markets of the European Union, where high domestic
prices have encouraged production. These countries
have thus changed from being net importers of nearly
five million tons per year in the 1970s to net exporters
of 20 million tons in the early 1990s.
The subsidized wheat exports of the European
Union continue to depress world prices. Wheat, which
is one of the most heavily protected products in the EU,
received production support averaging almost US$ 10
billion per year in 1999-2001, corresponding to a rate
of protection of almost 50%.
d) Peanuts
Peanuts are one of the main oleaginous products.
They are extensively cultivated in both the developing
and industrialized countries, and provide subsistence
and income to many poor peasants in the developing
world, especially in Africa and Asia. It is estimated that
in Senegal, for example, one million people (10% of
the population) are engaged in their production and
processing.
United States policy on peanuts, which was heavily
distorted by high subsidies and prohibitive tariffs
between 1930 and 2001, has been recently reformed, but
it still maintains high and redundant tariffs.
The liberalization of peanut prices would bring
significant net improvements in welfare for small
agricultural economies such as those of Malawi and
other West African countries.
The liberalization of the markets for products with
value added —oil and food products— would translate
into improvements in well-being in a number of
African countries (Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa).
e) Rice
Rice is the most important food grain in the entire
world. Its production and consumption are concentrated
in China, India, and Indonesia.
Box 2
BRAZIL’S EPIC STRUGGLE
Although the international dispute settlement mechanisms must still be improved, they can —as they stand
today— provide answers to situations of unfair competition in international trade. Such is the case of Brazil’s
struggle against United States’ subsidies to its cotton producers.
In March 2003 the Brazilian Government complained against the United States before the World Trade
Organization (WTO), arguing that the subsidies given by that country to its cotton producers —which totaled
US$ 13.1 billion between 1999 and 2003— had caused severe harm to Brazil because of the drop in international
cotton prices.
In April 2004, after considering the case for more than a year, a WTO dispute settlement panel concluded
that the United States regularly exceeded the limit declared to the WTO for its cotton subsidies. In particular,
the panel found that:
— The United States had used concealed export subsidies to evade its commitment to the WTO to reduce the
subsidies, and
— The United States’ domestic support subsidies for cotton in the trade year 2002/2003 had a significant
depressive effect on prices, thus seriously prejudicing Brazil’s exports. This means that the United States
will have to reform its current practices. In the final verdict, announced in June 2004, the panel’s
preliminary findings were ratified.
Source: Based on data from Oxfam International (2004) and international organizations.
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The support given to rice production amounts to
over US$ 26 billion per year in the OECD, and to an
astounding 700% of production costs in Japan (at world
prices). Tariff scaling (from paddy to milled rice) is
common practice in many countries, including those
of the European Union, where the tariff on milled rice
is prohibitive, except for small preferential import
quotas guaranteed to a few countries. For example, the
tariff applied to imports of milled rice in the European
Union is 80%, compared with 46% for brown rice.
If global reforms were applied—elimination of all
import barriers and all support measures—there would
be a price increase of about 33%, and 90% in the case
of medium and short grain rice. The producers in
Cambodia, China and Vietnam would be the main
beneficiaries, together with rice consumers in the high-
income Asian countries.
Since the main rice producers are small farmers,
the gains would also benefit the poor greatly.
4. Dispute settlement
Dispute settlement mechanisms are a means of
correcting the above-mentioned inequalities. Box 2 gives
an example of how to respond to unfair competition
in international trade.
X
The geography of rural poverty
With trade liberalization, there would be a marginal
displacement of agricultural production from north to
south, and the seriously depressed world prices of
many commodities would increase: by 10-20% for
cotton, 20-40% for dairy products, 10-20% for peanuts,
33-90% for rice, and 20-40% for sugar (World Bank,
2003).
Four countries —Bangladesh, China, India and
Indonesia— account for 75% of world rural poverty.
It is in Asia, therefore, that the increase in rural income
would have the biggest impact on poverty.
It is in the hands of the main industrialized
countries which make up the Group of Seven to decide




Economic progress is indispensable to defeat poverty,
but this progress must acknowledge that natural
resources and bio-diversity are assets that must be
preserved. Poverty will not be reduced unless the
sustainability of the ecosystems is ensured, especially
when increased production exerts more and more
pressure on the environment and on resources that are
not renewable.
It is a great contradiction that the industrialized
countries, which usually lead the way in advocating
such protection of the environment, are not consistent
with this approach when it comes to the sustainability
of their own rural economies, since they overload their
already depleted croplands and demand a higher
agricultural production out of it.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning the following
quote from an article in the Financial Times:
“...Subsidies for agriculture foster over-loading of
croplands, leading to erosion of topsoil, pollution from
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and release of
greenhouse gases...”6
6
 Myers and Tickell (2003).
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XII
The gains from trade liberalization
The World Bank has consistently pointed out the
distortions in world markets caused by protectionism
and has shown the benefits that trade liberalization
would bring to exports, production, and above all, to
the reduction of poverty.
About two years ago, the Bank carried out a
simulation exercise intended to determine the benefits
resulting from a Doha Round that eliminated import
duties, export subsidies, and subsidies to domestic
production, following a timetable to be completed by
the year 2015 (World Bank, 2001a). According to the
estimates (figure 2), the potential global gains from
such an agreement would amount to more than US$
800 billion a year, of which over two-third would be
associated with agricultural liberalization; these gains
would benefit both the developing and the
industrialized countries, with the latter receiving
approximately 40% of the gains.
Figure 3 shows the reduction in the number of
poor that such liberalization would bring, further to the
reduction as a result of the projected growth of the
global economy without the elimination of import
barriers.
The number of people living in extreme poverty
in the developing world would be reduced by 110
million: i.e., by approximately 15% of the number of
people living on less than a dollar a day estimated for
FIGURE 2
Potential gains from a Doha Round that
eliminates tariff barriers toward 2015

































2015. The number of poor with an income of less than
two dollars a day would go down by more than 300
million.
The report entitled Global Economic Prospects
and the Developing Countries, 2004 (World Bank,
2003) includes and exercise based on a less optimistic
estimate of the benefits from the Doha Round
negotiations. The exercise aims to lower the “tariff
ceilings” by setting maximum tariffs for agricultural
products of 10% in the industrialized countries and
15% in the developing countries, while the ceilings
for manufactured goods in industrialized and
developing countries would be 5% and 10%,
respectively.
This program, combined with the elimination of
agricultural subsidies and quotas, could generate two-
thirds of the gains resulting from a trade liberalization.
If it were implemented gradually over a period of five
years and there were a positive response in terms of
investments, in 2015 it would generate an additional
income of nearly US$ 350 billion for the developing
countries. In turn, the industrialized countries would
receive gains of US$ 170 billion.
As we can see, the benefits would be very consi-
derable and the gains for the developing countries
would be seven times greater than the concessional aid
currently provided by the industrialized countries.
FIGURE 3
Developing countries: Trade liberalization –
a powerful force for reducing world poverty
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The program in question would reduce world
poverty by 8%, i.e., by 61 million people in extreme
poverty and 144 million in the case of those currently
living on less than two dollars a day.
Some analysts have expressed their concern over
the imbalances among countries that could result from
a trade liberalization that increased the international
prices of agricultural goods and, in particular, they have
stressed the negative impact this would have on
countries that are net food importers.
Several studies have dispelled this concern. For
example, the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI, 2003) concludes that the elimination
of protectionism and agricultural subsidies in the
industrialized countries would bring about a threefold
increase in the positive trade balance of the
developing countries, with a favorable effect on all
types of countries. Thus, table 6 shows that the net
exporters of agricultural goods would increase their
trade surpluses, while the countries which are net
importers of such goods would reduce their trade
deficits.
What is true is that the possibility of countries
increasing their agricultural exports is indeed only
“potential”, and that it needs to be complemented with
domestic supply-related measures, such as the
improvement of the export sector infrastructure (roads,
ports, customs facilities, etc.), and demand-related
measures that consider modern marketing practices and
the higher sophistication of consumers in the
industrialized countries, who may tend to “differentiate”
products according to their origin.7
TABLE 6
Developing countries: Potential impact of liberalization of the
agricultural trade of the industrialized countries
(In billions of dollars)
Region Level of trade balance Level of agricultural trade Percentage increase in net
(exports less imports, balance after trade agricultural exports
or net exports) liberalization of  (negative value corresponds
in 1997 industrialized countries to a reduction in net
agricultural imports)
Africa South of the Sahara 7.4 10.7 45
Asia 12.3 22.8 85
Latin America and the Caribbean 31.7 46.4 47
Other developing countries –31.0 –19.1 –38
All developing countries 20.4 60.8 198
Source: Data of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2003).
7




We hope that this article, and in particular the figures
presented on the benefits of trade liberalization, will
clearly show the link between international trade and
global poverty, which was not evident at first. We trust
that the increasingly widespread acknowledgment of
the damage done by protectionism will translate into
concrete actions that will overcome the failure of the
Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003 and unfreeze
the Doha Round, paving the way toward a fairer
relationship among the countries engaged in global
trade.
We will conclude with a quote from the New
York Times, one of the newspapers with the greatest
impact on global public opinion: “Continuing on the
present perverse course will feed social instability and
environmental devastation throughout the developing
world. It will mean increased illegal migration to fill
agricultural and other jobs in richer countries, instead
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of increased jobs and incomes in the third world. Any
serious effort to combat extreme poverty, promote
third world development must begin with a radical
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